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Abstract
This paper studies the welfare costs and the redistributive effects of inﬂation in the presence of
idiosyncratic liquidity risk, in a micro-founded search-theoretical monetary model. We calibrate
the model to match the empirical aggregate money demand and the distribution of money
holdings across households, and study the effects of inﬂation under the implied degree of market
incompleteness. We show that in the presence of imperfect insurance the estimated long-run
welfare costs of inﬂation are on average 40% smaller compared to a complete markets,
representative agent economy, and that inﬂation induces important redistributive effects across
households. For example, the welfare gains of reducing inﬂation from 10% to 0% is 0.59% of
income. Furthermore, we estimate that the long-run welfare gains of reducing the typical current
inﬂation target of 2 to 1 percent to be 0.06% of income.
JEL classiﬁcation: E40, E50
Bank classiﬁcation: Inﬂation: costs and beneﬁts; Monetary policy framework
Résumé
Les auteurs étudient les conséquences de l’inflation sur le bien-être et sur la répartition des
revenus en présence d’un risque de liquidité idiosyncrasique, dans le cadre d’un modèle
monétaire fondé microéconomiquementet et inspiré de la théorie de la recherche. Après avoir
étalonné le modèle de façon à reproduire la demande de monnaie totale observée et la répartition
des encaisses monétaires entre les ménages, ils examinent les effets de l’inflation compte tenu du
degré d’incomplétude implicite des marchés. Ils montrent que, si l’on ne peut s’assurer
parfaitement contre les risques, les effets négatifs de l’inflation sur le bien-être en longue période
sont en moyenne inférieurs de 40 % à ce qu’ils seraient selon un modèle à agent représentatif et à
marchés complets; ils constatent également que l’inflation entraîne une redistribution importante
des encaisses entre les ménages. Ainsi, le gain de bien-être réalisé en ramenant l’inflation de 10 %
à 0 % représente 0,59 % du revenu. Les auteurs estiment en outre que, si la cible d’inflation était
fixée à 1 % au lieu des 2 % habituels, le gain équivaudrait à 0,06 % du revenu.
Classiﬁcation JEL : E40, E50
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Cadre de la politique monétaire; Inﬂation : coûts et avantages1 Introduction
The aim of most central banks in recent years has been to target a low positive long-run
inﬂation rate in a range of 1 to 3 percent. Yet, the welfare beneﬁts and/or costs of such
practice still lacks theoretical foundations and are not fully understood. The traditional
textbook models with complete, perfect markets, inﬁnitely-lived households and the possi-
bility to levy lump-sum taxes, imply that Friedman’s Rule - setting the nominal interest
rate to zero - is generally optimal. In such environments, inﬂation is always costly in terms
of welfare by serving as a distortionary tax on money holdings. In this paper we abandon
the assumption of complete markets and analyze the eﬀects of inﬂation in an environment
where agents are subject to uninsurable idiosyncratic liquidity risk and can only partially
undo their trading histories. In such an environment, although inﬂation still serves as a
distortionary tax (i.e. the traditional “real balance eﬀect”), there is a potential welfare im-
proving eﬀect of redistributive expansionary monetary policy - it can mitigate the welfare
costs of inﬂation by redistributing liquidity from agents with excess liquidity to agents that
are liquidity constrained.
We build on Lagos and Wright (2005) to develop a micro-founded search-theoretical
monetary model that emphasizes two empirically plausible features of an economy. First,
economic agents face idiosyncratic uncertainty regarding their productivity, preferences, and
trading opportunities. Second, agents are unable to insure against such risk due to some
degree of market incompleteness implied by the frictions in the economy that make money
essential. These features introduce some technical challenges since as a result of the agents’
heterogenous trading histories in a decentralized market one needs to keep track of a non-
degenerate distribution of money holdings. Lagos and Wright(2005) side-step this problem by
assuming that agents trade general goods in a centralized market periodically and have quasi-
linear preferences over these goods.1 These assumptions imply that agents can fully undo
1Alternatively, one can assume a general utility function as long as one assumes indivisible labor and
allow agents to trade lotteries a la Rogerson (1988) following Rocheteau et al. (2005).
2their idiosyncratic trading histories in the decentralized market, killing many potentially
interesting properties of standard search models. First, in a Lagos-Wright economy, money
is perfectly neutral and the model is unable to generate any short run dynamics in response
to an one-time money injection. Second, by forcing the money distribution to be degenerate,
the model precludes discussions of any distributional eﬀects of monetary policy. Third,
this model loses the interesting feature that inﬂation can provide an insurance function:
Friedman’s Rule is always optimal in the Lagos-Wright economy. We generalize the Lagos
and Wright model by relaxing their restrictive assumption of quasi-linear preferences and
use data on the empirical aggregate money demands, and the distribution of money holdings
across households for the U.S. and Canadian economies to calibrate the parameters of the
model. We ﬁnd that setting the Frisch elasticity of labor supply in the centralized market to
one-half can imply a money demand that ﬁts best the U.S. time series data. We interpret the
fact that the estimated Frisch elasticity for the United States is exactly one-half as further
support to our calibration. Furthermore, we present some evidence that the dispersion of
money holdings across households implied by our calibration is consistent with the empirical
money distribution. Note that a ﬁnite Frisch elasticity of labor implies that agents are not
able to fully undo their idiosyncratic trading histories, which we interpret as a certain degree
of market incompleteness.2 As a consequence agents will be heterogenous with respect to
their money holdings, in equilibrium.
We show that, given the implied degree of market incompleteness, the long-run welfare
costs of low and moderate inﬂations are on average 40% smaller compared to a representa-
tive agents (complete markets) economy. For example, we estimate the gains of decreasing
inﬂation from 10% to zero percent to be 0.59% of income, signiﬁcantly lower than Lucas
(2000) estimate of   1% or Lagos and Wright estimate of 1.3%.3 Considering the more pol-
2Note that, an agent’s state variable is his/her money holdings which summarizes his/her trading history,
and that the Frisch elasticity measures the willingness of agents to adjust their labor supply in order to
replenish their money balances, undoing their idiosyncratic trading histories.
3Here we consider Lagos and Wright estimate under the same pricing mechanism as we use - take-it-or-
leave-it-oﬀers by buyers.
3icy relevant exercise of decreasing the long-run inﬂation target from 2% to 1%, we estimate
the welfare gains to be 0.06% of income.4
The intuition of the ﬁndings is that, in this environment, the idiosyncratic liquidity
shocks and non quasi-linear preference imply that agents may not be willing to fully undo
their past trading histories, leading to a non-degenerate money distribution. As a result,
expansionary monetary policy can improve welfare through its redistributive eﬀect (See
Levine (1991), Deviatov-Wallace (2001), Molico (2006)). As the welfare gain from such
redistributive eﬀect partially oﬀsets the welfare loss due to the “real balance eﬀect”, the
net welfare cost of inﬂation is lower than that in standard representative agent models.
Moreover, as the inﬂation rate increases, the money distribution becomes less dispersed. As
a result, the marginal redistribution eﬀect of inﬂation is diminishing in the inﬂation rate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the environment. Section
3 deﬁnes an equilibrium. Section 4 discusses the numerical algorithm used to compute the
stationary equilibria of the model. In section 5, to facilitate the comparison of our results
to the existing literature, we calibrate the model to match the empirical money demand for
the U.S. economy and study the welfare cost of inﬂation. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
Time is discrete and denoted by t =0 ,1,2,.... There are two types of non-storable com-
modities: general and special goods. The economy consists of a continuum [0,1] of agents.
The per-period utility of an agent is given by
U(Xt) − C(Yt)+u(xt) − c(yt),
where U(X) denotes the utility of consuming X units of the general good, C(Y ) denotes the
disutility of producing Y units of the general good, u(x) denotes the utility of consuming x
4This estimate, however, ignores any transitional costs/beneﬁts of such policy change which is a question
we are currently investigating in a companion paper.
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Figure 1: Time line
units of the special good and c(y) denotes the disutility of producing y units of the special
good. We assume that u(.) and U(.) are twice continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing,
strictly concave, and satisﬁes U(0) = 0, U ( ¯ X) = 1 for some ¯ X>0, u (¯ x) = 1 for some ¯ x>0.
Also, C(Y ) is increasing and strictly convex, and c(y)=y. Discount factor is β ∈ (0,1).
In this economy, there is an additional, perfectly divisible, and costlessly storable object
which cannot be produced or consumed by any private individual, called ﬁat money. Agents
can hold any non-negative amount of money ˆ m ∈ R+. The money stock at the beginning of
period t is denoted Mt. In what follows we express all nominal variables as fractions of the
beginning of the period money supply (before the current period’s money transfers which we
will describe below), m ≡ ˆ m
M. Let νt : BR+ → [0,1] denote the probability measure associated
with the money (as a fraction of the beginning of period money supply) distribution at the
beginning of period t, where BR+ denotes the Borel subsets of R+.
Each period is divided into two subperiods: day and night. In the day time, there is
a decentralized market for trading special goods. In the night time, there is a centralized
market for trading general goods (see Figure 1).
As in standard search-theoretical models of money, in the decentralized market, agents
are subject to trading frictions modeled as pairwise random matching. To generate the need
for trade, we assume that agents cannot consume their own production of special goods. To
generate the use of money, we assume that the probability of having a double coincidence of
5wants meeting is zero and that all trading histories are private information.5 The probability
that an agent consumes something his/her match partner produces is σ ∈ [0, 1
2]. Similarly,
the probability that an agent produces something that his/her match partner consumes is
σ. Therefore, with a probability 1 − 2σ, trading partners do not want each other’s goods.
When two individuals meet and one consumes the good the other produces, they bargain
over the amount of output and the amount of money to be traded. Let qt(mb,m s;νt) ≥ 0
be the amount of output and dt(mb,m s;νt) ≥ 0 the amount of money determined by the
bargaining process at date t between a buyer with money holdings mb and a seller with
ms, when the probability measure at the beginning of the period is νt. In particular, the
terms-of-trade are assumed to be determined by take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers by the buyers.6 Let
ωt : BR+ → [0,1] denote the probability measure over money holdings at the entrance of the
centralized market (after trade in the decentralized market).
Agents take the price of money in terms of the general good in that market, φt, as given,
and decide how much of the general good to consume and produce, and how much money
holdings to carry into the decentralized market the next day. Given the environment, the
only feasible trades during the day are the exchange of special goods for money and at night
barter in general goods or the exchange of general goods for money.
The money stock is assumed to grow at a constant growth rate μ = Mt
Mt−1 for all t. Money
growth is accomplished via money transfers at the entrance of the decentralized market.
Given the distribution νt, an agent with money holdings m receives a monetary transfer at
the beginning of the period t decentralized market, τ(m,νt) (as in Lagos-Wright or Molico).
We assume that the monetary transfers (monetary policy rule) are such that rate of monetary
5For money to be valued it is only required that in some meetings there is no double coincident of wants.
For simplicity, we focus on purely monetary trades and, by assumption, preclude the possibility of barter in
the decentralized market.
6More generally, we could consider that the terms of trade were determined by the solution of a generalized
Nash-bargaining problem as in Lagos-Wright. As shown in that paper, if the seller has some bargaining power
additional distortions exist that would imply higher welfare costs of inﬂation. The same would be true here.
In that sense, we provide a lower bound for the welfare costs of inﬂation.




[m + τ(m,νt)] νt(m)dm. (1)
This concludes the description of the environment. In what follows, we will gradually
build towards the deﬁnition of equilibrium.
3 Equilibrium
In this section we deﬁne a recursive equilibrium for this economy. We begin by describing the
individual and aggregate state variables. An individual’s state variable consists of his/her
money holdings (as a fraction of the beginning of the period money supply). The aggregate
state variable is, in turn, deﬁned as the current probability measure over money holdings.
Thus, at the beginning of the period an individual’s state is described by the pair (m,ν), and
at the entrance of the centralized market by (m,ω). Agents take as given the law of motion of
the aggregate state variable deﬁned by ν  = Hν(ω) and ω = Hω(ν) which we will describe in
detail below, where prime denotes the future period.7 Also, agents take as given the price of
money in units of the general good in the centralized market, φ, as a function of the current
aggregate state, φ :Λ→ R+ \{ 0}, where Λ denotes the space of probability measures over
BR+.8 Finally, agents take as given the monetary policy rule (transfers) τ : R+ × Λ → R.
3.1 The Centralized Market
In what follows we ﬁrst describe the value function of agents at the entrance of the centralized
market.
Consider the expected lifetime utility of an agent in the centralized market, W(m,ω),
where m is the money balance held by the agent normalized by the beginning-of-the-period
7Equivalently, deﬁne the law of motion of the aggregate state variable by ν  = H(ν) ≡ Hν(Hω(ν)).
8Note that by restricting φ to be strictly positive, we focus on only monetary equilibrium in which money
has value.
7money stock. Given the price of money, φ(ω), and the monetary policy rules, the value
function is given by
W(m,ω) = max
X,Y,m+1≥0
U(X) − C(Y )+βV(m+1,ν
 )
s.t.
Y ≥ X + φ(ω)[m+1μ − m]
ν
  = Hν(ω), (2)
where V (m,ν) is the value function for an agent at the beginning of the day with money
balances m when the aggregate state is ν.9 Given the individual state m and aggregate state
ω, an agent chooses the optimal amounts of the general good consumption (X), the general
good production (Y ), as well as the money holding at the entrance of the next decentralized
market (m+1). The budget constraint simply states that the expenditure on consumption
and on net money purchase is no greater than the income from production.




[m+1(m,ω) − m] ω(dm)=0 . (3)
3.2 The Decentralized Market
We now consider the bargaining problem of an agent in the decentralized market. Consider
a single coincidence meeting when a buyer holds a money balance mb and a seller holds a
balance ms, after the decentralized market’s money injection, when the aggregate state is
ν. We assume that the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the seller. That is, he/she
9In what follows, we will assume that V (·,ω) is a continuous function. By the Theorem of the Maximum,
W(·,ω) is a continuous function and the set of optimizers is a nonempty, compact-value, and an u.h.c. corre-
spondence. By the Measurable Selection Theorem, deﬁne m+1(m,ω),X(m,ω),Y(m,ω) to be a measurable
section of such correspondence.




u(q)+W(mb − d,Hω(ν)) (4)
subject to
−q + W(ms + d,Hω(ν)) = W(ms,H ω(ν)).
Or, equivalently, by substituting the latter constraint into the objective function,
max
0≤d≤mb
u[W(ms + d,Hω(ν)) − W(ms,H ω(ν))] + W(mb − d,Hω(ν)).
The buyer makes an oﬀer to maximize his/her surplus subject to making the seller indiﬀerent
between trading and not trading. Note that, given that W(·,H ω(ν)) is a continuous func-
tion, the objective function of the bargaining problem is continuous. Also, the set d ∈ [0,m b]
is non-empty and compact. Thus, by the Theorem of the Maximum and the Measurable
Selection Theorem the set of optimizers is a non-empty, compact-valued, and u.h.c. corre-
spondence and admits a measurable a selection. Deﬁne d(mb,m s,ν) to be such selection.
The function q(mb,m s,ν) can then be obtained from the seller’s participation constraint.
The expected lifetime utility of an agent that enters the period with money balance m
(before the decentralized market money injection) is given by
V (m,ν)=( 1− σ)W[m + τ(m,ν),H ω(ν)] + σ
  ∞
0
{u[q(m + τ(m,ν),m s,ν)]
+ W {m + τ(m,ν) − d[m + τ(m,ν),m s,ν],H ω(ν)}} ν(dms). (5)
The ﬁrst term is the value for an agent that either is a seller, with probability σ, and thus
has a zero net surplus from trade, or meets no one, with probability 1 − 2σ. The second
term is the expected value of being a buyer.
93.3 Laws of Motions
Before deﬁning a recursive equilibrium for this economy, we describe the laws of motion
ν  = Hν(ω) and ω = Hω(ν). We begin by describing the evolution of the aggregate state
from the beginning of the centralized market to the beginning of the next decentralized





1,m +1(m,ω) ∈ B;
0, otherwise.
(6)
Given that, for each m,Π ( m,·;ω) is a probability measure on (R+,BR+), and, for each
B ∈ BR+,Π ( ·,B;ω)i saBR+-measurable function, Π is a well-deﬁned transition function.





Π(m,B;ω) ω(dm) ∀B ∈ BR+.
We now describe the evolution of the aggregate state from the beginning of the decen-
tralized market to the beginning of the centralized market. Let T = {buyer,seller,neither}
and deﬁne the space (T,T), where T is the σ-algebra. Deﬁne the probability measure
ψ : T → [0,1], with ψ(buyer)=ψ(seller)=σ, and ψ(neither)=1− 2σ. Then, (T,T,ψ)i s
a measure space. Deﬁne an event to be a pair e =( t,m), where t ∈ T and m ∈ R+. Intu-
itively, t denotes an agent’s trading status and m the money holdings of his current trading
partner. Let (E,E) be the space of such events, where E = T × R+ and E = T × BR+.
Furthermore, let ξ : E → [0,1] be the product probability measure. Deﬁne the mapping
γ(m,e):R+ × E → R+, where
γ(m,e)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
m + τ(m,ν) − d[m + τ(m,ν),·,H ω(ν)], if e =( buyer,·);
m + τ(m,ν)+d[·,m+ τ(m,ν),H ω(ν)], if e =( seller,·);
m + τ(m,ν), otherwise.
10We can now deﬁne P : R+ × BR+ → [0,1] to be
P(m,B;ν) ≡ ξ({e ∈ E|γ(m,e) ∈ B}).




P(m,B;ν) ν(dm) ∀B ∈ BR+







Π[¯ m,B;Hω(ν)] P(m,d¯ m;ν)] ν(dm) ∀B ∈ BR+. (7)
3.4 Recursive Equilibrium
We are ﬁnally ready to deﬁne a recursive equilibrium for this economy.
Deﬁnition 1 (Recursive Equilibrium) A recursive equilibrium is a list of:
Pricing function: φ :Λ→ R+\{0};
Monetary Policy Function: τ : R+ × Λ → R;
Law of motion: H :Λ→ Λ;
Value functions: V : R+ × Λ → R and W : R+ × Λ → R;
Policy functions: X : R+ × Λ → R+, Y : R+ × Λ → R+, and m+1 : R+ × Λ → R+;
Terms of Trade: q : R+ × R+ × Λ → R+ and d : R+ × R+ × Λ → R+;
such that:
1. given the pricing function, the monetary policy functions, the law of motion, the terms
of trade, and the policy functions, the value functions satisfy the functional equations (2) and
(5);
2. given the value functions, the pricing function, the monetary policy functions, and the
10By construction, for each m, P(m,·;ν) is a probability measure on (R+,BR+). Furthermore, given the
measurability of d(·,·;ν), P(·,B;ν)i saBR+-measurable function.
11law of motion of the aggregate state, the policy functions solve (2);
3. given the value functions, the terms of trade solve (4);
4. given the terms of trade and the monetary policy functions, the law of motion of the
aggregate state is deﬁned by (7);
5. given the value functions, the monetary policy functions satisfy (1);
6. the centralized market clearing condition, (3), is satisﬁed.
In the remainder of the paper we will only focus on stationary equilibria, where, ν = H(ν).
4 Numerical Algorithm
In this section we brieﬂy present the numerical algorithm developed for ﬁnding stationary
monetary equilibria of the model and discuss some computational considerations. The basic
strategy of the algorithm is to iterate on a mapping deﬁned by the value function equations
(2) and (5) and the law of motion of the aggregate state given by equation (7). Special care is
taken in keeping track of the distribution of wealth and its composition across iterations. In
particular, we keep track of a large sample of agents’ money balances and use non-parametric
density estimation methods. A Fortran 90 version of the code is available from the authors
by request. We begin the algorithm at the entrance of the centralized market.
A brief description of the algorithm follows:
Step 1. Given an initial guess for the distribution of money holding at the entrance of
the centralized market, draw a large sample of agents’ money balance.11
Step 2. Deﬁne a grid on the state space of money holdings and an initial guess for the
value function at the entrance of the decentralized market, V 0(m), by deﬁning the value of
the function at the gridpoints and using interpolation methods to evaluate the function at
any other point.12
11In all the numerical exercises we use a sample of 10 000 agents.
12We use a grid of 30 gridpoints unevenly spread so as to capture well the change in concavity of the value
function. We experimented with increasing the number and location of the gridpoints without signiﬁcant
quantitative or qualitative implications for our results. An Akima interpolation method from the IMSL
12Step 3. Given the sample of money holdings at the entrance of the centralized market
and the value function at the entrance of the decentralized market, ﬁnd the market clearing
price by solving the centralized market problem for all agents in the sample and iterating on
φ, given an initial guess, until the market clears.
Step 4. Given these, the function W(.) is given by (2) .
Step 5. Given the market-clearing price, update the money holding of the agents by
solving their optimization problem. The distribution of money holding at the decentralized
market is estimated using Gaussian kernel non-parametric density estimation methods.13
Step 6. Given the value function W(.) and the distribution of money holdings at the
entrance of the decentralized market, update the value function V (m) by using the mapping
deﬁned by equation (5) to compute its value at the new gridpoints and re-estimating the
interpolant coeﬃcients.
Step 7. For each individual on the sample, update their money holding by simulating
their meetings to derive the distribution at the entrance of the centralized market.
Repeat steps 3 to 7 until convergence is achieved.
5 Numerical Results
In what follows we use the numerical algorithm presented in the last section to ﬁnd and
characterize stationary equilibria of the model. In particular, we characterize the typical
features of a stationary equilibrium of the model and illustrate the eﬀects of inﬂation.
We adopt the following functional forms for the utility and cost functions. In the decen-
fortran routines was used to keep track of all functions.
13To deal with the fact that the money holdings choices of the participants might imply the existence
of mass points in the distribution we introduce a very small perturbation (a ﬁnd a penny- lose a penny
assumption) in their optimal choice to smooth the distribution allowing the usage of the Gaussian kernel
estimation method.
13tralized market, the utility of consumption is:
u(x)=
(x + b)1−η − b1−η
1 − η
,
and the cost of production is normalized to be
c(y)=y.
In the centralized market, the utility of consumption is given by:
U(X)=B log(X),








Our objective is to parameterize the model in order to match the velocity of money
(i.e. the money demand to GDP ratio) implied by the data. Note however that, in the
model, the velocity of money is aﬀected by several parameters. In particular, it is aﬀected
by the curvature parameter η, by the arrival rate σ, the choice of the length of a period (or
equivalently, β). Furthermore, most of these parameters are not observable. In the absence
of other clear targets, the parameters are not perfectly identiﬁable from the data. As such,
in the exercises that follow we ﬁx some of the parameters. For the exercises below we set
b   0 and η =0 .99, and thus the utility function is close to log. We pick σ =0 .5 to minimize
the search frictions. We deﬁne the length of a period to be one year and set the discount
factor to β =0 .96 implying an annual real interest rate of 4 percent. Given the length of
the period, we choose B and χ such that the income velocity of money is around 5 for two
percent inﬂation, and around 7 for ten percent inﬂation, matching the U.S. historical data.
Table 1 summarizes the parameter values used. It turns out that setting χ to 0.5 and B













































Figure 2: Model implication: Inﬂation and Velocity
to 5 can match the observation well. Interestingly, setting χ to 0.5 is consistent with the
estimated Frisch elasticity found in empirical micro studies.










d(m, ˜ m,ν) ν(dm) ν(d˜ m).
Figure (2) shows the relationship between inﬂation and velocity implied by the model in
the stationary equilibrium. We begin by characterizing a stationary equilibrium. Figure (3)
shows the equilibrium policy functions in the centralized market for the case of zero inﬂation.
Note that the money demand, m+1(m,ω), and consumption, X(m,ω), are increasing in m
while the production, Y (m,ω), is decreasing in m. In contrast, due to the quasi-linearity





















Figure 3: Policy functions in CM
assumption, these choices are independent of individual money holdings in the Lagos-Wright
model.
Figure (4) and (5) show the terms of trade functions, d(mb,m s) and q(mb,m s). These
functions are diﬀerent from that of the Lagos-Wright model in which the constant marginal
value of money in the centralized market (due to the quasi-linear preference) implies that
the terms of trade are independent of the seller’s money holding. In our model, the marginal
value of money is diminishing and, as a result, the quantity of goods traded (q) is increasing
in the buyer’s money holding (mb), but decreasing in the seller’s money holding (ms). Also,
the amount of money traded (d) is increasing in both agents’ money holdings.
Figure (6) illustrates the monetary distribution at the beginning of the period, ν(m).
In Lagos and Wright, the quasi-linear preference implies that all agents choose the same
money demand, resulting in a degenerate monetary distribution. In our model, the con-
vex cost function in the centralized market discourages agents from perfectly undoing their
idiosyncratic trading histories, resulting in a non-degenerate monetary distribution.
























































































Figure 6: Monetary Distribution ν(m)
17should make sure that the monetary distribution implied by the model is able to capture
certain dimensions of the actual cross-sectional money distribution. There are, however, two
diﬃculties involved. First, the data on the distribution of money holdings is limited.14 Sec-
ond, the model focuses on transitory shocks and abstracts from other uninsurable persistent
shocks which are probably related to the long right tail of the empirical distribution.
To get an idea about the dispersion in the empirical monetary distribution, we use the
data from the 2004 Survey of Consumer Finance to obtain the distributions of chequing
and transaction account balances across U.S. households as a proxy.15 The 10th,9 0 th and
100th percentiles of these two distributions are shown in Table 5, together with the same
percentiles implied by the model.16 As shown in the table, this model is unable to match
the long tail of the upper end of the empirical distribution. But the distribution implied by
the model can match the tenth percentile and the ninetieth percentile relatively well.
Percentile Model Chequing account (Data) Transaction account (Data)
10th 0.05 0.00 0.00
90th 2.05 1.90 1.80
100th 2.23 4695.50 1894.10
90th − 10th 2.00 1.90 1.80
We now consider the eﬀects of inﬂation on the stationary monetary equilibrium. Table
2 reports the outcomes of the stationary equilibrium for annualized inﬂation rates of −2%,
0%, 2%, 10%, and 20%. With higher inﬂation, the price of money in terms of the general
good in the centralized market, in general, goes down. Since inﬂation increases buyers’ cost
of the special goods in the decentralized market, the average consumption and the relative
size of the decentralized market go down. As agents economize on their money holdings, the
money demand drops and the velocity of money rises. Figure (6) plots the eﬀect of money
14For example, there is no good data on currency distribution.
15In this survey, chequing accounts do not include money market accounts. Transaction accounts consist
of money market, chequing, saving and call accounts.
16In the table, the money distribution of the model refers to that of the weighted average of the individual
money holdings across the two markets, with the weights given by the output shares of the two markets.
18growth on the money distributions ν(m). In general, as the money growth rate increases,
the distribution collapses to a degenerate distribution, as in the case of Lagos and Wright.
Table 2: Eﬀects of Monetary Policy
Rate of Inﬂation -2% 0% 1% 2% 10% 20%
Price of Money 0.71 0.48 0.43 0.39 0.26 0.22
Average consumption in DM 0.92 0.87 0.84 0.83 0.72 0.62
Size of DM (% of GDP) 8.58% 8.23% 8.05% 7.93% 7.00% 6.08 %
Velocity 2.63 3.88 4.36 4.72 7.10 8.23
Money Demand/GDP 0.38 0.26 0.23 0.21 0.14 0.12
Now we study the welfare eﬀects of monetary expansion. We will measure the welfare cost
of inﬂation by deriving how much consumption agents would be willing to sacriﬁce to reduce
inﬂation to 0%. Using Xμ, Yμ, qμ, dμ, νμ and ωμ to denote the functions and distributions
in an equilibrium with inﬂation rate μ − 1, we can deﬁne the average expected value with
inﬂation rate μ − 1a s










[U(Xμ(m,ωμ)) − C(Yμ(m,ωμ)] ωμ(dm)}.
Then the welfare cost of having money growth rate μ relative to zero inﬂation is given
by 1 − Δ0(μ) where Δ0(μ) solves










[U(X0(m,ω0)) − C(Y0(m,ω0))] ω0(dm)}.
Welfare cost of inﬂation
First, given the parameter values, we ﬁnd that the welfare cost of 10% inﬂation is 1 −
Δ0(10%) = 0.59% of output, as reported in table (3). This number is 40% lower than
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Figure 7: Value Function V and Distribution ν in DM
the estimate of Lucas (around 1%) and 55% lower than that of Lagos and Wright (1.3%)
(for the same pricing mechanism as we use in this paper). In these representative agent
models, expansionary monetary policy through lump sum money transfers only has real-
balance eﬀects, but not any distributional eﬀects. However, in a heterogenous agent model,
an these expansionary monetary policy can redistribute real money balances from liquidity-
rich agents to liquidity-poor agents and condense the monetary distribution (Figure (7)).
This redistribution eﬀect tends to raise the average welfare in the economy.
One may mechanically decompose the inﬂation eﬀects on the average utility into two
parts: the eﬀect of changing the distribution and the eﬀect of changing the decision rules.
For example, Figures (8) and (9) decompose the change in average utility in the decentralized
market as inﬂation goes up from 0% to 10% into the change in the distribution and the
change in the quantity of goods traded. In these graphs, the joint distribution of buyers and
sellers’ money holdings is represented by dots and the quantities of goods traded, q(mb,m s)
is represented by the contour lines. As shown, higher inﬂation rate condenses the money
distribution, and also lowers the quantity of trade in a match. Similarly, Figures (10) and
20Table 3: Welfare Cost of Inﬂation (relative to to 0%)
Rate of inﬂation 1% 2% 10% 20%
Distribution ν in DM
• 90th percentile -10th percentile 1.00 0.90 0.34 0.26
Average price of goods
• in decentralized market 0.83 0.91 1.38 1.60
• in centralized market 2.33 2.56 3.85 4.55
Welfare cost 0.08% 0.14% 0.59% 0.88%
Welfare Change (% of consumption ), due to
• change in distribution only +0.04 +0.11 +0.74 +0.79





















Figure 8: Quantity q(mb,m s) Contours and Money Distribution in DM (0%)
(11) decompose the change in the average utility in the centralized market. These two will
combine to generate the change in the average (total) utility, as reported in Figure (7).

























Figure 9: Quantity q(mb,m s) Contours and Money Distribution in DM (10%)















Figure 10: Decision Rules and Money Distribution in CM (0%)















Figure 11: Decision Rules and Distribution in CM (10%)







BUYER       
[ u(qμ(m, ˜ m))
      
consumption in DM
+U(Xμ(m − dμ(m, ˜ m))) − C(Yμ(m − dμ(m, ˜ m)))
      
consumption and production in CM
]
+
SELLER       
[ −qμ(˜ m,m)
      
production in DM
+U(Xμ(m + dμ(˜ m,m))) − C(Yμ(m + dμ(˜ m,m)))
      
consumption and production in CM
] }νμ(dm) νμ(d˜ m)






{Λ(m, ˜ m,qμ(m, ˜ m),d μ(m, ˜ m),X μ(m),Y μ(m))} νμ(dm) νμ(d˜ m).
In particular, when the inﬂation rate is 0, the average utility is given by:







{Λ(m, ˜ m,q0(m, ˜ m),d 0(m, ˜ m),X 0(m),Y 0(m))} ν0(dm) ν0(d˜ m).
Inﬂation can change the average utility by either changing the distribution of money
holdings (i.e. νμ) or the decision rules (i.e. qμ(m, ˜ m),d μ(m, ˜ m),X μ(m),Y μ(m)). Here, we
23can mechanically perform the following experiment: changing the distribution of money
across agents, but holding the decision rules unchanged. In particular, we use the (old)
decision rules (q0(m, ˜ m),d 0(m, ˜ m),X 0(m),Y 0(m)) associated with a steady state equilibrium
with a 0% inﬂation to derive the average utility implied by the (new) monetary distribution
associated with a steady state equilibrium with a 10% inﬂation (νμ):
¯ U







{Λ(m, ˜ m,q0(m, ˜ m),d 0(m, ˜ m),X 0(m),Y 0(m))} νμ(dm) νμ(d˜ m).
Table (3) shows that, as inﬂation increases, the distribution of money holdings becomes
less dispersed and the purchasing power of money goes down. The combined outcome is
that the welfare cost goes up. Using the decomposition discussed above, we can see that
changing distribution alone tends to raise the average utility, but this positive eﬀect is always
oﬀset by the change in the decision rules. As a result, the welfare cost of inﬂation is always
positive. Furthermore, as inﬂation increases, the money distribution becomes less dispersed.
As a result, the marginal redistributive eﬀect of inﬂation is diminishing in the inﬂation rate
(Figure (12)).
Price Distribution and Inﬂation
Figures (13)-(15) report the eﬀect of inﬂation on the distribution of normalized prices,
which is the price of goods in each trade divided by the average price in the decentralized
market. The normalized price distribution becomes less dispersed as inﬂation goes up. This
is due to the changes in the underlying money distribution, as shown in Figure (16)-(18).
Frisch elasticity of labor supply and eﬀects of monetary policy
This section discusses the relationship between the Frisch elasticity of labor supply and
welfare eﬀects of inﬂation. Figure (19) and Table (4) report the implications of the model
as we change the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, captured by χ. We use our benchmark
calibration and change χ from inﬁnity to 0.01. As illustrated in Figure (19), increasing χ
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Figure 12: Decomposition of Inﬂation Eﬀect on Welfare


















Figure 13: Normalized Price Distribution in DM (0%)


















Figure 14: Normalized Price Distribution in DM (10%)















































































































Figure 18: Normalized Price Contours and Money Distribution in DM (20%)



























Figure 19: Money Demand and the Degree of Market Incompleteness
Table 4: Frisch elasticity of labor supply and eﬀects of monetary policy
μ χ = ∞ χ =5 χ =0 .5 χ =0 .01
Money Demand 0% 0.17 0.17 0.26 0.30
2% 0.16 0.16 0.21 0.23
10% 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15
90th percentile - 10th percentile in DM 0% 0.00 0.23 1.11 1.24
2% 0.00 0.08 0.90 1.10
10% 0.00 0.09 0.34 0.61
Welfare cost 2% 0.03 0.04 0.14 0.17
10% 0.25 0.22 0.59 0.72
makes the demand for money less responsive to inﬂation. Also, as χ reduces, the monetary
distribution becomes more dispersed, and the welfare cost of inﬂation goes up.
Comparative Static Experiment using the Lagos-Wright parameters
Here, we take the Lagos-Wright model (i.e. χ = ∞) as a benchmark and perform
comparative static exercise as we adjust the parameter χ. We use the following set of
parameter values calibrated in Lagos and Wright (2005): θ =1 ,σ=0 .5,η=0 .16,B=1 .97.
As we reduce the parameter χ, money demand becomes more responsive to inﬂation, and the
monetary distribution in the decentralized market becomes more dispersed. Even though
28Table 5: Comparative Static Experiment (Lagos-Wright parameters)
χ = ∞ χ = 10000 χ = 100 χ =1
Distribution ν in DM
90th percentile − 10th percentile
• 0% inﬂation 0.00 0.00 0.07 1.48
• 10% inﬂation 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.63
Average quantity in DM
• 0% inﬂation 0.61 0.60 0.60 0.47
• 10% inﬂation 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.17
Money demand
• 0% inﬂation 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.29
• 10% inﬂation 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.08
Welfare Cost 1.45 1.45 1.41 1.13
Welfare Change, due to
• change in dist. ν only 0.00 0.00 +0.01 +0.09
• change in dist. and dec rules -1.45 -1.45 -1.41 -1.13
Parameter values: θ =1 ,σ=0 .5,η=0 .16,B=1 .97
money demand is more sensitive to inﬂation, the welfare cost goes down. Again, the change
in decentralized market distribution always has a positive eﬀect on the average utility.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper studies the welfare costs and the redistributive eﬀects of inﬂation in the presence
of idiosyncratic liquidity risk, in a micro-founded search-theoretical monetary model. We
calibrate the model to match the empirical aggregate money demand, compare the implied
distribution of money holdings across households with the empirical distribution, and study
the eﬀects of inﬂation under the implied degree of market incompleteness. We show that in
the presence of imperfect insurance the estimated long-run welfare costs of inﬂation are on
average 40% smaller compared to a complete markets, representative agent economy, and
that inﬂation induces important redistributive eﬀects across households. We estimate that
the long-run welfare gains of reducing inﬂation from 2 to 1 percent to be 0.06% of income.
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